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CRIMINAL LAW - WITNESSES: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
VICTIMS NOT CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED BY
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE FROM TESTIFYING
VIA ONE-WAY CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION
Sandra Ann Craig owned and operated a pre-school and kin-
dergarten in Howard County, Maryland.' Craig was alleged to
have physically, sexually, and psychologically abused several chil-
dren at the school.2 Criminal charges were brought against
Craig.3 Prior to trial, the state moved to allow the alleged victims
to testify outside of the presence of the defendant, Craig, via
closed-circuit television.4 Section 9-102 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland permits a
court to allow a child abuse victim to testify outside the courtroom,
and outside the physical presence of the defendant, through one-
way closed-circuit television if "[t]he judge determines that testi-
mony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot rea-
sonably communicate." 5 The trial judge made such a determina-
1. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3160 (1990).
2. Id.
3. Id. Defendant Craig was charged with "child abuse, first and second degree sexual
offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery." Id.
4. Id. at 3160-61. The Maryland statute allows, in certain situations, child witnesses in
child abuse cases to testify via one-way closed circuit television. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989). The Maryland statute provides in relevant part that:
(a) (1) In a case of abuse of a child... a court may order that the testimony of a
child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by
means of closed-circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge
may question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to be
unobtrusive.
(b) (1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when
the child testifies by closed-circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child,
including a person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting
concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge and the
defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the
persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic
method.
5. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(aXlXii) (1989).
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tion based on expert testimony presented by the state.6 After
finding several of the children competent to testify, the trial judge,
over Craig's objection, allowed the children to testify through
means of one-way closed-circuit television.7 Craig was convicted,
and appealed.8 The conviction was affirmed by the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals." The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed and remanded.' 0 The United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and
remanded, and held that the confrontation clause does not invaria-
bly require a face-to-face confrontation between a defendant and
a child witness in a child abuse case." The Court found the
requirements of the confrontation clause to be satisfied when a
child witness in a child abuse case testifies using a procedure that
protects the reliability of the evidence, provided the state has
shown that the use of such procedure is required to protect the
child witness from emotional trauma that would result from testi-
fying in the physical presence of the defendant.' 2  Maryland v.
Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
The sixth amendment's confrontation clause provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' 3 Traditionally,
the confrontation clause has been interpreted to require witnesses
in a criminal trial to appear "face-to-face" with the defendant at
6. Id. at 3161-62. The trial judge did not himself question the potential child witnesses.
Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, -, 560 A.2d 1120, 1128 (1989). Rather, the trial judge heard
testimony from expert witnesses who indicated that if the children were to testify in the
courtroom, the children would suffer "serious emotional distress... such that each of these
children [could] not reasonably communicate." Id. at -, 560 A.2d at 1129.
7. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161-62. Craig objected to the use of the Maryland procedure,
contending that use of the procedure violated her sixth amendment right to confront
accusatory witnesses. Id. The trial court rejected Craig's contention. Id. The trial court
reasoned that while the procedure does take" 'away the right of the defendant to be face to
face with his or her accuser,' the defendant retains the 'essence of the right of
confrontation,' including the right to observe, cross-examine, and have the jury view the
demeanor of the witness." Id. at 3162.
8. Id.
9. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (1988).
10. Craig. v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989).
11. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169-70. In Craig, the United States Supreme Court stated that:
[W]here necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would be caused
by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such
trauma would impair the child's ability to communicate, the Confrontation
Clause does not prohibit use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-
face confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to




13. Id. at 3162 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1015-16 (1988Xdiscussing origins of defendant's right to confront witnesses against him).
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trial.
1 4
The requirement that witnesses appear "face-to-face" at trial
serves to assure the reliability of evidence admitted against the
defendant.' 5 When a witness testifies at trial, the witness testifies
under oath and is subject to cross examination by the defendant. 16
When a witness testifies at trial, the jury is able to observe the
manner in which the witness testifies, and the witness's demeanor
while testifying.17 Therefore, the jury is able to assess whether the
testimony given by a witness against the defendant is credible.18
In Maryland v. Craig,19 the United States Supreme Court
found that the requirement of face-to-face confrontation is not
indispensable.20  In limited situations, face-to-face confrontation
has been held to be not required by the confrontation clause.2 '
These limited situations have generally involved the admission of
various hearsay statements such as dying declarations and those of
nontestifying co-conspirators.1 In such situations, the Court has
"attempted to harmonize the goal of the Clause - placing limits
on the kind of evidence that may be received against a defendant
- with a societal interest in accurate factfinding, which may
require consideration of out-of-court statements."' Thus, while
under the confrontation clause a preference exists for face-to-face
confrontation, in exceptional circumstances a defendant's right to
14. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3162. Generally, a defendant has a right to a face-to-face
confrontation with accusatory witnesses at trial. Id. However, a defendant's right to
confront witnesses against him has not been held to afford a defendant an absolute right to a
face-to-face confrontation with those witnesses. Id. at 3163 (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 3802-
03).
15. Id. at 3163-64. The Court noted that "[t]he central concern of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting
it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Id.
at 3163.
16. Id. The requirements of face-to-face confrontation are "physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. ... Id. These
elements of face-to-face confrontation help to assure that evidence admitted against a
defendant is reliable. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)).
18. Id.
19. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
20. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3164-66 (1990).
21. Id. at 3164-65. The Court noted in Craig, that under certain circumstances,
hearsay statements have long been admissible at trial, even though the defendant is unable
to confront the declarant at trial. Id. at 3164 (citations omitted). But see Maryland v. Craig,
110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Craig, Justice Scalia argued
that the confrontation clause specifically requires that a defendant be given the opportunity
for face-to-face confrontation with witnesses against him. Id. at 3171-76. Justice Scalia
noted that in the hearsay situation, the accused is not denied his confrontation clause right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Id. at 3173. In the hearsay situation, the
witness against the criminal defendant is not the declarant, but rather the person who
testifies as to the declarant's statements. Id.
22. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3173.
23. Id. at 3165 (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
be confronted with the witnesses against him may be met without
face-to-face confrontation.24 These exceptional circumstances
exist only when the trustworthiness of the testimony is guaran-
teed, and only when denial of face-to-face confrontation is neces-
sary to advance an "important public policy."25
In Craig, the Court determined that, provided the requisite
determination of necessity was made, Sandra Ann Craig's right to
confront accusatory witnesses was not violated by use of the one-
way closed-circuit television procedure provided for in the Mary-
land statute.28 Under the Maryland procedure, in certain circum-
stances, a child witness in a child abuse case may testify at trial
outside the physical presence of the defendant.2 7 In order to use
the procedure, the trial judge must make a specific finding that the
child would suffer serious emotional distress if the child were to
testify in the courtroom.2 When the procedure is invoked, the
child witness testifies via one-way closed-circuit television. 29 The
defendant, judge and jury can all observe the child on the televi-
sion screen and hear as the child testifies; however, the child can-
not see the defendant.3 °
In Craig, the Court reasoned that Maryland's statutory proce-
dure would assure the reliability of testimony against the defend-
ant.31 All of the elements of confrontation, absent testimony
within the physical presence of the defendant, were provided for
in the procedure.32 The procedure requires that the child witness
be competent to testify and testify under oath.33 The child witness
may be cross-examined by the defendant. 34 As the child witness
testifies, the child's demeanor is observed by the judge, jury and
defendant.35 Thus, under the Maryland procedure, the testimony
of a child witness is "subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a
24. Id. at 3165-66 (citations omitted).
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 3170. A defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses
against him may not be deprived absent a "case-specific finding of necessity." Id.
27. Id. at 3161. See supra note 4 (partial text of relevant Maryland statute).
28. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161. In order to invoke the Maryland procedure, the
emotional distress that the child witness would suffer, if the child were to testify in the
courtroom, must be so serious "that the child [could] not reasonably communicate." Id.
(citing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(aXlXii) (1989)). See supra note 4 (partial
text of Maryland statute).
29. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3166-67.
32. Id. at 3166. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (elements of
confrontation assure reliability of testimony against defendant).
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manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person
testimony. '3 6 Therefore, subjecting the child witness's testimony
to such "rigorous adversarial testing" assures the reliability of the
testimony.37
A defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation with accu-
satory witnesses may only be denied upon a finding of necessity.38
A finding of necessity requires that the denial of face-to-face con-
frontation be required to advance an "important public inter-
est."'39  The Court noted as evidence of the importance of
protecting child victims, that many states have enacted laws
aimed at protecting child witnesses in child abuse cases.40 The
United States Supreme Court has traditionally recognized the
states' interests in the protection of the physical and mental health
of children.41 Thus, the Court reasoned that protecting the physi-
cal and mental health of victims of child abuse is an "important
public policy."
42
In Craig, the Court held that a defendant's right to confront
witnesses is satisfied under a procedure like the Maryland proce-
dure, if the use of the procedure is required to protect the well-
being of the individual child witness who is to testify.43 The proce-
dure must be necessary to protect the child witness from emo-
tional trauma that would result from testifying in the physical
presence of the defendant.44 The Court stated that any emotional
distress that would result from merely testifying in a courtroom
36. Id. The Craig court noted that the "assurances of reliability and adversariness
[provided for in the Maryland procedure] are far greater than those required for admission
of hearsay testimony under the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 3167.
37. Id. at 3166-67.
38. Id. at 3166. See also Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990Xconfrontation
clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation, therefore, denial of face-to-face
confrontation generally requires a finding of necessity).
39. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166-69. The United States Supreme Court, in Craig, noted
that the states' "interest in 'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling' one." Id. at 3167 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 3167-68. See id. at 3167-68 n.2 (legislation allowing videotaped testimony);
id. at 3168 n.3 (legislation allowing one-way closed-circuit televised testimony); id. at 3168
n.4 (legislation allowing two-way closed-circuit televised testimony).
41. Id. at 3167-68. The Maryland statute was enacted for the specific purpose of
protecting the physical and mental health of child abuse victims. Id. at 3168 (citing
Windermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 518, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (1987)). The statute was
intended to protect "child victims by avoiding, or at least minimizing, the emotional
trauma produced by testifying." Id. (quoting Windermuth, 310 Md. at 518, 530 A.2d at
286). In Craig, the Court stated that it would not "second-guess" the importance given the
public policy in protecting child victims. Id. at 3169.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-09
(1982Xright of press and public to attend criminal trials should not be restricted absent case-
by-case finding of necessity).
44. Id.
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would not be sufficient to deny a defendant the opportunity of
face-to-face confrontation.4 5 The Court also held that any emo-
tional trauma that the child might suffer must be more than
minor.46 Thus, in order for a child witness in a child abuse case to
testify using the Maryland procedure, use of the procedure must
protect the child from emotional distress that is not minor, and
that would result from testifying in the physical presence of the
defendant.41
The Court of Appeals of Maryland had held that a finding of
necessity required the judge to first question the child witness in
the presence of the defendant, and that the possibility of using a
two-way closed-circuit television be explored before using a one-
way closed-circuit television procedure.4 * As the trial judge had
not examined the child witnesses in the presence of the defendant,
and did not explore the possibility of using two-way closed-circuit
television, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new
trial.49 In Craig, the United States Supreme Court declined to
require that states employ "as a matter of federal constitutional
law, any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites [for a determi-
nation of necessity] for the use of the one-way television proce-
dure." ° Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment of the lower
45. Id. Were the emotional distress of the child witness merely to result from testifying
in a courtroom situation, it would not be necessary to deny a defendant face-to-face
confrontation. Id. Rather, "the child could be permitted to testify in less intimidating
surroundings, albeit with the defendant present." Id.
46. Id. In Craig, the Court did not determine the minimal amount of emotional
distress required to permit the use of a procedure such as the Maryland procedure. Id. The
Court found that the Maryland requirement of "serious emotional distress..." was clearly
sufficient. Id. (quoting MD. CTS. & JUD. PlOC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989)).
47. Id. at 3169-70.
48. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, _ 560 A.2d 1120, 1127-29 (1989). The Court of
Appeals of Maryland interpreted the United States Supreme Court decision of Coy v. Iowa
to require that before allowing a child to testify via one-way closed-circuit television, the
trial judge must first question the witness in the physical presence of the defendant. Id. at
-, 560 A.2d at 1128 (interpreting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)). Under the court of
appeals' interpretation of Coy, where "the child suffer[s] serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate," in the presence of the defendant, the trial
judge must next explore the possibility of using two-way closed-circuit television. Id. If the
use of a two-way television procedure would also result in serious emotional trauma, then
the court of appeals would sanction use of the one-way closed-circuit television procedure.
Id.
49. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3171 (quoting Craig v. State, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 3171).
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (trial judge heard expert testimony that the
children would suffer emotional distress were the children to testify).
50. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3171. The Court noted that the "evidentiary requirements
[advocated by the court of appeals] would strengthen the grounds for use of protective
measures... ." Id. The Court, however, refused to require these measures under federal
constitutional law. Id.
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